

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OECD P 26657 01 OF 04 132131Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIEP-01

COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 SAM-01 OES-06

SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 EA-07 PA-01 PRS-01

FEA-01 NEA-10 ARA-06 /127 W

----- 093434

P R 132113Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION OECD PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 3343

INFO ALL IEA CAPITALS 0039

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 OECD PARIS 26657

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: IEA- SEPTEMBER 8 RESTRICTED MEETING ON

REDUCED DEPENDENCE AND CIEC

1. INFORMAL MEETING OF HEADS OF KEY IEA DELEGATIONS
CALLED BY CHAIRMAN DAVIGNON IN BRUSSELS CONCENTRATED
ON (1) NEXT STEPS ON CONSUMER EFFORT TO REDUCE
DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL INCLUDING U.S. PROPOSAL
FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL REDUCED DEPENDENCE
OBJECTIVES; AND (2) STRATEGY FOR FINAL MONTHS OF
CIEC ENERGY COMMISSION. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED:
US, EC, JAPAN, CANADA, SWITZERLAND, UK, FRG, NORWAY,
DENMARK, NETHERLANDS, AND IEA SECRETARIAT

2. REDUCED DEPENDENCE - DAVIGNON AND LANTZKE OPENED
DISCUSSION WITH BRIEF SUMMARY OF OECD'S NEW LONG-
TERM ENERGY ASSESSMENT AND ITS STARK PROJECTIONS FOR
STEADY RISE IN DC DEPENDENCE ON OPEC OIL THROUGH 1990
(ASSUMING ENERGY POLICIES CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OECD P 26657 01 OF 04 132131Z

EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN). DAVIGNON SAID

THAT DC RESPONSE TO ENERGY PROBLEM TO DATE IS CLEARLY INADEQUATE, PARTICULARLY IN US AND EC. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS RISING DEPENDENCE WERE OBVIOUS. QUESTION IS WHAT IF ANYTHING ARE DCS PREPARED TO DO ABOUT IT AND WHAT SHOULD BE ROLE OF IEA. LANTZKE INTRODUCED FOR DISCUSSION PAPER HE HAD DRAFTED OUTLINING PROCESS FOR SYSTEMATIC ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL REDUCED DEPENDENCE TARGETS AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO MEASURES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THEM AS PROPOSED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS SPEECH AT OECD MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MAY.

3. U.S. DEL (BOSWORTH) SAID WE ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH LTEA PROJECTIONS AND IN FACT OUR OWN RECENT ESTIMATES OF FUTURE ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOW A SOMEWHAT LARGER POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR OPEC OIL OF PERHAPS AS HIGH AS 38 MMBD BY 1985 AND AS MUCH AS 45 MMBD BY 1990. THIS SITUATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY RESULT IN SEVERE INCREASE IN DC VULNERABILITY TO REAL PRICE INCREASES AND THREATS OF SUPPLY INTERRUPTION. MOREOVER, THERE IS REAL QUESTION WHETHER THAT VOLUME OF OIL WOULD IN FACT BE AVAILABLE SINCE MOST OF POST-1980 INCREASE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM SAUDI ARABIA WHICH NOW HAS AN 8.8 MMBD PRODUCTION CEILING AND WHOSE WILLINGNESS TO PRODUCE UP TO 15-18 MMBD IS AT LEAST QUESTIONABLE.

IF THE SAUDIS, IN FACT DO NOT INCREASE PRODUCTION CAPACITY TO THESE LEVELS, THE UPWARD MARKET PRESSURE ON PRICE WOULD BE EVEN MORE INTENSE.

DC'S HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT OUR ABILITY TO IMPROVE OUR ENERGY SITUATION OVER NEXT 5 YEARS THROUGH NEW POLICY DECISIONS IS LARGELEY LIMITED TO CONSERVATION WHERE SAVINGS CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL BUT NOT DECISIVE. HOWEVER, CRUCIAL QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN TAKE NOW OR IN NEAR FUTURE POLICY DECISOIONS ON BOTH LONGER-TERM CONSERVATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OECD P 26657 01 OF 04 132131Z

MEASURES AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SUPPLIES WHICH WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT IN THE GLOBAL ENERGY BALANCE IN MID-1980'S. LTEA'S ACCELERATED POLICY CASE INDICATES THAT POTENTIAL FOR IMPORT REDUCTION IS IN FACT SUBSTANTIAL (AS MUCH AS 12-14 MMBD LESS IMPORTS THAN IN CASE ASSUMING CONTINUATION OF ONLY THOSE POLICIES NOW IN PLACE, BUT ACHIEVEMENTS OF IMPORT SAVINGS APPROACHING THIS

MAGNITUDE IN 1980'S REQUIRES POLICY ACTION NOW.
SOME COUNTRIES MAY WELL MOVE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR
ENERGY MEASURES REGARDLESS OF WHAT IEA DOES. U.S., FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OECD P 26657 02 OF 04 132122Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIEP-01

COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 SAM-01 OES-06

SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 EA-07 PA-01 PRS-01

FEA-01 NEA-10 ARA-06 /127 W

----- 093241

P R 132113Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION OECD PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 3344

INFO ALL IEA CAPITALS 0040

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 OECD PARIS 26657

EXAMPLE, RECOGNIZES THAT ITS RESPONSE TO ENERGY PROBLEMS IS STILL INCOMPLETE. HOWEVER, UNLESS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD IN COORDINATED FASHION, CONSUMER COOPERATION AND IEA WOULD INEVITABLY LOSE BOTH POLITICAL MOMENTUM AND RELEVANCE TO REAL ENERGY PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL DECISION. MOREOVER, CREATION OF MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH EACH COUNTRY WOULD TAKE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES WOULD BE MAJOR REINFORCEMENT OF U.S. NATIONAL EFFORT. SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL IN MAY WAS PUT FORWARD IN THIS OVERALL ENERGY AND POLITICAL CONTEXT. U.S. FINDS LANTZKE DRAFT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE (WITH MINOR

CHANGES) AND BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE CONVERTED TO
DRAFT GOVERNING BOARD DECISION OUTLINING PROCESS
AND PURPOSES OF COORDINATED ESTABLISHMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL REDUCED DEPENDENCE OBJECTIVES
AND THAT THIS DECISION SHOULD BE ADOPTED PROMPTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OECD P 26657 02 OF 04 132122Z

BY GOVERNING BOARDS.

4. BOSWORTH EMPHASIZED THAT EARLY ACTION IS CRUCIAL
LTEA REVISION WITH PROJECTIONS OF MASSIVE INCREASE
IN IMPORT DEPENDENCE SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE IN
OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER. OPEC PRICE INCREASE IN DECEMBER
APPEARS LIKELY. OPEC WILL LIKELY JUSTIFY THIS IN-
CREASE PRIMARILY ON BASIS OF AN ALLEGED EROSION
OF THE PURCHASING POWER OF THEIR EXPORT EARNINGS DURING
PRICE FREEZE SINCE OCTOBER 1975. BUT UNLESS
IEA COUNTRIES SHOW WE RECOGNIZE ARE RESPONDING
PROMPTLY TO THESE NEW PROJECTIONS, WE WILL BE
GIVING OPEC EXCUSE FOR MUCH LARGER INCREASES,
PERHAPS IN DECEMBER, BUT CERTAINLY IN 1977
AND BEYOND. OPEC WILL ARGUE THAT OUR OWN PROJECTIONS
OF MASSIVE INCREASE IN DEMAND FOR THEIR OIL MEANS THAT
PRICE STILL NOT HIGH ENOUGH TO STIMULATE SERIOUS
COMMITMENT TO CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW
SUPPLIES.

5. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, NO DELEGATION CHALLENGED
ASSESSMENT OFFERED BY DAVIGNON, LANTZKE, AND U.S.
THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO
ESTABLISH COLLECTIVE IEA REDUCED DEFENCE
OBJECTIVES, BASED ON RIGOROUS EXAMINATION OF
INTERNAL PROGRAMS AND JUDGEMENT ON HOW MUCH THEY
CAN BE IMPROVED. HOWEVER, THERE WAS PREDICTABLE
RESISTANCE TO NEXT STEP OF ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES
FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD THEN
BECOME BENCHMARK FOR ON-GOING IEA REVISION
NATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENT. MAJOR
OPPOSITION CAME FROM JAPAN (CONCERN THAT ENERGY
OBJECTIVE WOULD GOVERN AND PREJUDICE GENERAL
ECONOMIC POLICY BUT CANDID ADMISSION THAT GOJ
WOULD NOT STAND AGAINST IEA CONSENSUS) AND
UK AND NORWAY (FEAR THAT OTHERS WOULD USE NATIONAL
OBJECTIVES PROCESS TO CRITICIZE THEIR NATIONAL
POLICIES AND PRODUCTION CEILING IN NORTH SEA).
GERMANS, DUTCH, AND CANADIANS OFFERED NO REAL
OBJECTION TO NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
PROPOSED EXCEPT CONCERN THAT IT WOULD PROVE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OECD P 26657 02 OF 04 132122Z

TOO TIME CONSUMING AND FOCUS ATTENTION ON ISSUE
OF NUMBERS RATHER THAN NEED FOR POLICY ACTION. THERE
WAS ALSO CONCERN THAT, WHILE COMMITMENTS TAKEN
BY COUNTRIES WITH PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
WOULD EFFECTIVELY BE COMMITMENTS ON GOVERNMENTS,
RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT UNLESS US
ADMINISTRATION CAN SELL PROGRAMS TO CONGRESS, US
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY THROUGH ON COMMITMENTS
TAKEN WITHIN IEA CONTEXT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OECD P 26657 03 OF 04 132123Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIEP-01

COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 SAM-01 OES-06

SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 EA-07 PA-01 PRS-01

FEA-01 NEA-10 ARA-06 /127 W

----- 093330

P R 132113Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION OECD PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 3345

INFO ALL IEA CAPITALS 0041

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 OECD PARIS 26657

6.IN REPLY, U.S. STRESSED (1) NO INTENTION TO ALLOW
ENERGY OBJECTIVES TO PREJUDICE GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY

DPTIONS, BUT CRITICAL NEED FOR IMPROVED ENERGY BALANCE
MUST BE ONE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS IN OVERALL ECONOMIC
POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. NATIONAL ENERGY OBJECTIVES
WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO REFLECT DIFFERENCES BOTH IN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOALS. THEY WOULD CLEARLY REQUIRE
PERIODIC ASSESSMENT, BOTH TO MEASURE PERFORMANCE
ND TO DETERMINE THEIR CONTINUED COMPATIBILITY WITH
OTHER NATIONAL GOALS AND POLICIES. (2) U.S.
RECOGNIZES THAT THERE MUST BE PARALLELISM AMONG
COMMITMENTS TAKEN BY VARIOUS IEA GOVERNMENTS. WE
STRESSED THAT TYPE OF COMMITMENT WE ENVISION IS NOT
THAT OF A LEGALLY BINDING NATURE AS IN A TREATY BUT
RATHER THE FIRM EXPRESSION OF THE TREND AND BASIC
PDLICY CONTEXT OF NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAMS. U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OECD P 26657 03 OF 04 132123Z

WOULD SEEK TO INSURE THAT SUCH A U.S. UNDERTAKING
WITHIN THE IEA HAD REQUISITE SUPPORT IN US CONGRESS TO
MAKE IT EFFECTIVE. WE DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN STERILE
DEBATE OVER NUMBERS. BUT THERE MUST BE SOME
QUANTIFIED ARRANGEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR ATTAINMENT OF OVERALL IEA REDUCED
DEPENDENCE TARGET OR THERE WILL BE NO BENCHMARK
AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND
ENTIRE PROCESS WILL HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY VIS-A-VIS
OUR OWN PUBLICS AND OIL PRODUCERS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, GROUP AGREED THAT GOVERNING
BOARD SHOULD TAKE UP QUESTION OF REDUCED DEPENDENCE
TARGETS AS PRINCIPAL ITEM OF BUSINESS IN ITS FORMAL
MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 21. LANTZKE WILL REVISE HIS
PAPER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING TO PRESERVE
CONCEPT OF ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

WHILE INDICATING PROCESS IS NOT
CENTERED SIMPLY ON NUMBER FIXING EXERCISE. QUESTION
OF DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY ON INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL
TARGETS IS CLEARLY KEY ISSUE, BUT WITH CONTINUED
STRONG SUPPORT FROM DAVIGNON--WHO IS VERY CLEAR ON THE
POLITICAL NEED FOR THIS ELEMENT IN THE OVERALL
PROCESS--WE BELIEVE ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT CAN BE
ACHIEVED ON THIS POINT. LTEA NOW SCHEDULED FOR
RELEASE IN LATE OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER. GROUP AGREED
THAT IEA SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ITS POLICY RESPONSE TO THE
LTEA PROJECTIONS BEFORE THESE BECOME PUBLIC. THERE-
FORE, WE ARE POINTING TOWARD FIRM GOVERNING BOARD
DECISION IN OCTOBER.

8. STRATEGY FOR CIEC ENERGY COMMISSION: IN

DISCUSSING CIEC, IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT, NOT-WITHSTANDING CURRENT DIFFERENCES OVER AGENDA FORMULATION, FOR PURPOSES OF IEA WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT CIEC WOULD RESUME. LOOKING FORWARD TO PROSPECTIVE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL, DAVIGNON AND OTHERS INDICATED THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE PROSPECT FOR SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS IN OTHER THREE COMMISSIONS. THIS BOTH PLACES MORE PRESSURE ON ENERGY COMMISSION TO PRODUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OECD P 26657 03 OF 04 132123Z

SOMETHING OF VALUE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKES SUCH A RESULT FROM THE ENERGY COMMISSION MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. LACK OF MAJOR PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE MAKES IT EASIER FOR OPEC TO RESIST CONCEPT OF ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS.

9. EC DEL (WILLIAMS) INTRODUCED DISCUSSION OF ON-GOING ENERGY DIALOGUE AFTER DECEMBER AND INDICATED EC IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPING PAPER ON THIS ISSUE WHICH COULD BE INTRODUCED IN OCTOBER CIEC SESSION. GENERAL AGREEMENT WAS EXPRESSED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OECD P 26657 04 OF 04 132126Z

66
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIEP-01

COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07 FPC-01 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 SAM-01 OES-06

SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 EA-07 PA-01 PRS-01

FEA-01 NEA-10 ARA-06 /127 W
----- 093335

P R 132113Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION OECD PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 3346
INFO ALL IEA CAPITALS 0042
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 04 OECD PARIS 26657

ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS WITH PRODUCERS WOULD BE USEFUL,
BUT NO SUGGESTIONS WERE FORTHCOMING WITH RESPECT TO
FMAT OR FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSIONS.

10. USDEL (BOSWORTH) NOTED THAT WHILE U.S. FAVORED
POST-CIEC ENERGY DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE NOT WILLING TO
"PAY ANYTHING" FOR THEM EITHER BY DOING MORE THAN WE
WOULD OTHERWISE DO IN OTHER AREAS OF CIEC OR BY
SATISFYING OPEC ON THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION OF
PURCHASING POWER. FOR THEIR PART, OPEC SEEMS TO BE
QUESTIONING DESIRABILITY OF ANY INSTITUTIONALIZED ON-
GOING CONSULTATIONS ON ENERGY. THEIR MISGIVINGS
APPARENTLY STEM FROM EXPERIENCE IN CIEC WHERE PTICI-
PATION OF NON-OIL LDC'S EXPOSES OPEC TO SHARPENED
CRITICISM ON OIL PRICE ISSUE AND CREATES STRAIN ON
THEIR POSITION WITHIN G-77. USDEL SUGGESTED IN
ADDITION TO ON-GOING DIALOGUE ENERCOM WOULD HAVE TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OECD P 26657 04 OF 04 132126Z

ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO NON-OIL
LDC'S, SUCH AS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OBLEMS RESULTIHG
FROM OIL PRICE INCREASES, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE

CAPITAL FUNDING OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT. THE
LAST TWO COULD BE MET IN SOME MEASURE BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL ENERGY INSTITUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCE BANK. BOSWORTH ALSO NOTED THE SPECIAL CONCERN
OF SAUDI ARABIA VIS-A-VIS ITS ACCUMULATED ASSETS AND
THE NEED TO SHOW THAT WE TAKE THIS CONCERN SERIOUSLY.

11. WITH REGARD TO OIL PRICE OUTLOOK, GROUP AGREED
THAT STATUS AND RESULT OF CIEC UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY
MAJOR IMPACT ON OPEC DECEMBER PRICE DECISION, BUT A
FAILED CIEC COULD CONCEIVABLY STRENGTHEN POSITION OF
THOSE WITHIN OPEC WHO FAVOR LARGER RATHER THAN
SMALLER INCREASE. GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SUMS
INVOLVED, A DIFFENCE OF EVEN A FEW PERCENTAGE POINTS
WOULD HAVE MAJOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
CONSEQUENCES.

TURNER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976OECDP26657
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760345-0436
From: OECD PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760967/aaaacfat.tel
Line Count: 439
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <29 MAR 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IEA- SEPTEMBER 8 RESTRICTED MEETING ON REDUCED DEPENDENCE AND CIEC
TAGS: ENRG, IAEA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006